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[S]tudies have found that when a U.S. issuer lists abroad on a foreign
exchange, its shares exhibit negative abnormal returns. This negative movement may be because the market expects that the foreign listing will facilitate undetectable insider trading on the foreign exchange or other conduct
impermissible in the United States.1

† Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
†† Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in
Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV 641, 674– 5 (1999) [hereinafter Future as History].
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Introduction
India has already seen the first listing by a foreign-domiciled issuer on
the National Stock Exchange of India (NSE), via Standard Chartered Bank
PLC’s Indian Depositary Receipt (IDR) initial public offering in May of
2010.2 In the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China), the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the Shanghai Stock Exchange
seem poised to establish an “international board,” allowing non-PRC3-domiciled issuers to conduct initial public offerings (IPO) into the purely
domestic Chinese equity markets.
These proposed and accomplished listings by foreign firms in India,
China, and some other emerging markets may seem surprising. Indeed,
much of the discussion of cross-listing— the practice of firms from one
country listing in another country— has focused on listing by non-United
States and non-U.K. firms on U.S. and U.K. exchanges. Cross-listing in the
latter direction may be motivated by a number of considerations, but one
that seems to have captured a great deal of attention is the desire of foreign
firms to be subject to the corporate and securities laws and enforcement of
the U.S. and the U.K., which may be perceived as being stronger than those
in their own country. This theoretically allows such firms to signal that
they can meet these higher standards, which in turn may attract some
investors who are willing to pay a higher price.4 This account— commonly
known as the “legal bonding” hypothesis— does not intuitively suggest that
U.S. or U.K. firms would want to list in jurisdictions in the opposite direction, such as in India or China. Listing in a country perceived to have
weaker investor protections might send a correspondingly negative signal.
Yet the world has already seen these listings in the opposite direction, and
we anticipate such transactions will only increase in the future.5 Accordingly, these types of cross-listings (which we call “reverse cross-listings”)
may present something of a puzzle for analysts and theorists alike.
In this brief Article we ponder what reverse cross-listing may mean for
(i) a more nuanced view of what drives the traditional “legal bonding”
account, and (ii) a more complete picture of the motivations of those issuers seeking to raise capital in a foreign venue. Indeed, our analysis here
reminds us that there are likely to be multiple important determinants of
2. Press Release: Standard Chartered PLC Sets Indian Depository Receipt Price
Band, Standard Chartered (May 23, 2010) (on file with author), available at https://
www.sc.com/in/news-media/pdf/2010_25_may_standard_chartered_plc.pdf.
3. As will be readily understood in the context of this article, we do not include the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong) within the defined term “PRC”
or “China”, even though Hong Kong became an integral part of the sovereign PRC after
July 1, 1997. Under the promise of “One Country-Two Systems” and the PRC Hong
Kong Basic Law, the Hong Kong legal system, foreign exchange system and capital markets remain largely separate from the equivalent systems and markets of the rest of the
PRC (what many people in Hong Kong refer to as the “mainland” or “mainland China”).
4. See Marcelo Bianconi & Liang Tang, Cross-listing Premiums in the US and UK
Destination, INT’L REV. OF ECON. & FIN., 244, 248 (2010).
5. See Felix Salmon, Chart of the Day: When U.S. Companies IPO Abroad, REUTERS
BLOG (May 27, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/05/27/chart-of-theday-when-us-companies-ipo-abroad/.
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an issuer’s choice of where to list in our truly global capital markets. These
include (i) the simple quest for capital from any available capital market;
(ii) the possibility of obtaining higher initial valuations in capital controlssegmented markets, with the promise of higher secondary market trading
values upon achieving enhanced global liquidity; (iii) the desire for capital
in local currency (especially where the local currency is not fully convertible and the foreign issuer has significant investments and operations in the
country); (iv) attempts to list in a market with a less burdensome regulatory environment; and (v) what we call “consumer-commercial markets
bonding.”
Here we explore the concept of consumer-commercial markets bonding in greater depth, as it may play a critical role in understanding the
likelihood of reverse cross-listing in India, China, and other similar markets. Our notion of this kind of consumer-commercial markets bonding
includes (i) the advertisement of products, services and corporate identity;
(ii) identification of the issuer as a global firm with a local identity and
ownership; (iii) demonstrated commitment to key products markets as well
as customers and regulators in those markets; (iv) a “tipping of the hat” to
the sovereign and legal-regulatory establishment governing the receiving
market; and (v) an appeal to the receiving market’s regulators for the provision of franchising or licensing benefits.6 It is indeed conceivable that, for
some firms at least, these potential benefits could be enough to outweigh
the potential costs for listing in a market with lesser perceived investor protectors as originally suggested by the “legal bonding” hypothesis.
We should note that we are cognizant of how problematic terms like
“developing” and “developed,” “emerging” and “mature,” and “well-regulated” and “un-” or “badly-regulated” are when applied to national jurisdictions, their legal and regulatory systems, and political economies.7
Accordingly, we prefer to distinguish countries with “better or stronger perceived investor protections” from those with “weaker perceived investor protections.” We are referring, of course, to more than the formal laws and
regulations related to investor protection. Specifically, we are trying to capture differences in the common perceptions of how corporate governance
and market regulation systems are implemented, enforced, and followed.8
Thus, we will include the U.S. and the U.K. under the category of jurisdictions with better investor protections, and India and China under the category of nations with weaker investor protections— evaluations captured in
6. See generally Capital Markets in 2025: The Future of Equity Capital Markets, PWC
IPO CENTRE (Oct. 17, 2011), at 2, available at http://www.pwc.com/capitalmarkets2025
(predicting future growth in Asia as companies look to benefit from the “associated profile” listing there may provide).
7. See Rethinking the “Third World”: Seeing the World Differently, THE ECONOMIST
(June 12, 2010), available at http://www.economist.com/node/16329442.
8. This could also include evidence of general transparency; legislative/regulatory
design competence; predictability, consistency, fairness, technical competence, and efficiency in application; general conformity with rule of law principles; independence from
political considerations; robust and unbiased enforcement against bad market actors of
whatever political or economic background; and levels of corruption.
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broadly-accepted indices.9
However, we are aware of how many of these perceptions may not be
fully accurate, or are exaggerated. For example, it is not the case that the
U.S. and the U.K. have been immune from scandals and market manipulations; the experience of the last 13 years clearly belies such a belief. Moreover, the ease with which investors can seek redress before the judicial
system or regulatory agencies of the United States appears to be diminishing if one takes into account recent decisions by the United States Supreme
Court such as Stoneridge10 and Morrison.11 Conversely, both of us have
written on the ways in which India’s and China’s developing markets, for
example, are better governed than is commonly assumed and have been
taking steps to enhance effective investor protection.12 Notwithstanding
these developments, a great deal of the discourse in this area is predicated
on those commonly-held perceptions.13 Accordingly, we will use these
terms to identify the jurisdictions we invoke and analyze.
Finally, we want to be clear about what we do not address in this Article. First, we do not rehearse the many reasons why weaker perceived
investor protection markets like India and the PRC have a strong desire for
direct listings by issuers from jurisdictions with greater investor protections. Second, we discuss only issuers domiciled and truly headquartered
in stronger perceived investor protection jurisdictions who engage in
reverse cross-listing. Thus, we do not discuss situations where, for
instance, Russian firms might cross-list into India or China14 (because
Russia is perceived to have weaker investor protection than the U.S. or
U.K.)15, or where firms with business primarily in India or China, but officially domiciled in a stronger perceived jurisdiction (e.g., Hong Kong or
Bermuda), cross-list in India or China,16 or where issuers from stronger
perceived jurisdictions list in, for example, Hong Kong17 (which is associated with stronger investor protections). Third, we do not rehearse the discourse in the United States as to why cross-border capital raising appears
9. See, e.g., Protecting Investors, WORLD BANK GROUP (June 2013), http://www
.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/protecting-investors.
10. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
11. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
12. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g. World Bank, supra note 9.
14. For example, the 2010 US $2.6 billion IPO and listing on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange (HKSE) of Russia’s United Company RUSAL. Andreea Papuc, ed., Rusal Raises
$2.24 Billion in Hong Kong IP (Update 1), Bloomberg (Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.forbes
.com/2010/01/21/rusal-ipo-deripaska-markets-equities-hong-kong.html.
15. World Bank, supra note 9.
16. For example, the Shanghai Stock Exchange IPOs of several foreign domiciled
PRC-controlled “Red Chips,” like China Mobile.
17. For example, Standard Chartered Bank’s longtime listing on the HKSE, or
Prada’s US$ 2.14 billion IPO and listing on the HKSE in 2011. Bettina Wassener,
Prada’s I.P.O. Debuts in Hong Kong Amid Investor Jitters, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2011),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/pradas-i-p-o-debuts-in-hong-kong-amid-inves
tor-jitters/?_r=0.
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to have turned away from the U.S.,18 or why some foreign private issuers
have sought to de-list from U.S. exchanges.19 It is often asserted, somewhat ironically in the context of this article, that this is the result of the
burdens of over-regulation in the United States.20 Instead, our narrow
focus here is on issuers, originating from jurisdictions that are perceived to
have stronger investor protections, seeking to raise capital and have their
equity publicly-listed in jurisdictions with weaker perceived investor protection. This might be viewed as consistent with an emphasis on an “issuer
choice” analysis21 as well as being responsive to the assumed directional
vector of the “legal bonding” hypothesis (i.e., rest-of-world issuers listing on
U.S. or U.K. exchanges).
I.

The “Legal Bonding” Hypothesis

The “legal bonding” hypothesis has a long and distinguished history.
Over two decades of theoretical and empirical work across countries has
led to accretions, alterations, and refinements of the hypothesis.22 Indeed,
judging from the recent literature grappling with the concept,23 the “legal
bonding” hypothesis continues to have real force and relevance. For the
purposes of this article, it is instructive to go back to the earliest theoretical
articulations of what the “legal bonding” motivation/effect was supposed
to be in the 1990s – the heyday of cross listings to the U.S. In his seminal
18. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S
US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 12 (2007).
19. Id. at 50.
20. See, e.g., Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION (2006), available at http://capmktsreg.org/app/
uploads/2014/08/Committees-November-2006-Interim-Report.pdf; BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 18, at 15.
21. “Issuer choice” analysis is the idea that capital formation operates most efficiently when issuers are allowed to choose the (national) regulatory regime applicable to
them, rather than being subject to exclusive regulation applied pursuant to territorialbased jurisdiction. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity,
Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 921
(1997-1998).
22. See Gordon Alexander et al., Asset Pricing and Dual Listing on Foreign Capital
Markets: A Note, 42 J. FIN. 151 (1987); Amir N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real:
International Securities Regulation in a World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38 VA J.
INT’L. L. 563 (1998); Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675 (2002); John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market
Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (2002)
[hereinafter Racing to the Top]; Amir N. Licht, Cross-listing and Corporate Governance:
Bonding or Avoiding, 4 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 141 (2003); Craig Doidge et al., Why Are Foreign
Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?, 71 J. OF FIN. ECON. 205 (2004); Amir N. Licht, Li Xi
& Jordan I. Siegel, What Makes Bonding Stick? A Natural Experiment Involving the
Supreme Court and Cross-listed Firms, Harvard Business School Working Paper 11-072
(2011).
23. See John Ammer, Sara B. Holland, David C. Smith & Francis E. Warnock, Why
Do U.S. Cross-Listings Matter?, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Int’l Fin. Discussion Papers No. 930 (May 2008); Licht, Li & Siegel 2011, supra note 22; Steven S.
Crawford, The Role of Market Forces and Legal Institutions in Bonding Cross-listed Firms
(Rice University, Working Paper, 2011).
AND THE
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1999 article, John Coffee tried to counter anxiety about a potential transnational “race to the bottom” in both the corporate governance and securities
regulation spheres with the introduction of a “legal bonding” hypothesis,
which he summarized as follows:
Large firms can choose the stock exchange or exchanges on which they are
listed, and in so doing can opt into governance systems, disclosure standards, and accounting rules that may be more rigorous than those required
or prevailing in their jurisdiction of incorporation. This process of migration may over time prove to be as important as the standard American
interjurisdictional competition for corporate charters. In theory, migration
should give rise to a form of regulatory arbitrage, under which firms seek to
play one legal regime against another by threatening to migrate to less “regulatory” jurisdictions. Yet, the most visible contemporary form of migration
seems motivated by the opposite impulse: namely, to opt into higher regulatory
or disclosure standards and thus to implement a form of “bonding” under which
firms commit to governance standards more exacting than that of their home
countries.24 [emphasis added]

Professor Coffee further speculated on the reasons why foreign firms, even
those that have never offered or issued securities in the U.S., might make
the very costly election to list on a U.S. stock exchange. These reasons may
include (i) gaining liquidity (especially for issuers confined to smaller markets); (ii) the pursuit of international recognition and/or prestige; (iii) raising additional capital; (iv) increasing share value; and (v) the creation of
currency (U.S.-listed stock) for U.S.-focused acquisitions.25
Professor Coffee then suggested that the “bonding” effect may play a
critical role:26
But greater motivation probably lies in the finding, repeatedly observed by
financial economists, that the announcement of a dual listing on a U.S.
exchange by a foreign firm typically increases the firm’s share value . . . .One
explanation . . . is that such a listing represents a bonding mechanism: the
foreign issuer is increasing the share value of its public shares by agreeing to
comply with the generally higher disclosure standards that prevail in the
United States. Some evidence supports this interpretation, as opposed to the
explanation that dual markets simply increase the demand for stock,
because other studies have found that when a U.S. issuer lists abroad on a
foreign exchange, the opposite occurs: its shares exhibit negative abnormal
returns. This negative movement may be because the market expects that
the foreign [i.e., non-U.S.] listing will facilitate undetectable insider trading
on the foreign exchange or other conduct impermissible in the United
States.27

Finally, Coffee speculated on a final reason for this apparent “race to the
top” style of regulatory arbitrage, at least for newer firms: the issuer’s home
24. Future as History, supra note 1, at 651– 52.
25. Id. at 673– 74.
26. Per Coffee, coined by economists Michael Jensen and William Meckling in a
seminal 1976 article. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 325
(1976).
27. Future as History, supra note 1, at 674– 75.
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market evidences a relative lack of legal protections for minority shareholders, making it difficult for such companies to win the trust and confidence
of investors (whereas older companies are asserted to have higher reputational capital, a substitute for the weakness in legal protections).28 Subsequently, Professor Coffee developed his views to focus on how and why
firms with concentrated, rather than dispersed, ownership structures act
across global capital markets.29
The mature form of the “legal bonding hypothesis” can thus be summarized as follows:
• Cross-listing on a U.S. exchange commits the foreign issuer to respect
minority rights and to provide for fuller disclosure.30 This is because:
° The foreign issuer becomes subject to the enforcement powers of the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC);31
° Investors acquire the power to exercise effective and low-cost legal remedies, such as class actions and derivative actions,32 that may not be
available in the issuer’s home jurisdiction;33
° Entry into the markets of the United States commits the firm to provide
fuller financial information per SEC requirements and to reconcile
financial statements to the generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) followed in the United States;34
• Foreign issuers become subject to the scrutiny of U.S. reputational
intermediaries or gatekeepers,35 including underwriters, accountants,
28. Id. at 678– 79.
29. To predict that “those firms that decline to migrate to “high disclosure”
exchanges will be disproportionately those with controlling shareholders who prefer to
maximize their receipt of the private benefits of control rather than to maximize the
share price of their firms’ publicly-held minority shares.” See Racing to the Top, supra
note 22, at 1765. In our view, there is an unstated corollary to the prediction: that even
some issuers from concentrated ownership jurisdictions will be willing to bear the costs,
liability risks and regulatory risks of a U.S. listing if the other benefits (reputational,
liquidity enhancing and price effects) are substantial enough. This is certainly what
occurred with the initial listings by PRC corporatized state-owned enterprises like
Shanghai Petrochemical (via a Hong Kong Stock Exchange listing backed into a U.S.listed ADR program) and then Shandong Huaneng Power Development (direct IPO and
listing on the NYSE) in 1992– 1994. See generally Mark S. Bergman, Richard S. Borisoff,
& Nicholas C. Howson, First Direct Listing for Chinese Company in New York, 13 INT’L.
FIN. L. REV. 41 (1994).
30. Racing to the Top, supra note 22, at 1780.
31. See id.
32. Although listing in the U.S. by a non-U.S. issuer may subject the firm to the risk
of U.S. securities fraud class actions, it is not clear to us how a U.S. listing by a non-U.S.
issuer incorporated in a jurisdiction that does not have a corporate derivative action can
subject the board of directors of that company to a derivative action authorized and
available under U.S. state law.
33. See generally Donald Clarke & Nicholas Calcina Howson, Pathway to Minority
Shareholders’ Protection – Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China, and
Vikramaditya Khanna & Umakanth Varottil, The Rarity of Derivative Actions in India:
Reasons and Consequences, in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA 243, 369 (Dan W. Puchniak
et al. eds., 2012).
34. See generally Mergers & Acquisitions – a Snapshot, PWC (Apr. 7, 2014), available
at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/cfodirect/assets/pdf/ma-snapshot-cross-border-navi
gating-sec-reporting.pdf
35. Coffee was of course writing before Enron, WorldCom, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, or the very strict 2014 SEC enforcement action against global but U.S. or
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credit rating agencies and securities analysts;36 and
• Foreign issuers will become subject to U.S. exchange-imposed37 corporate
governance-related requirements.38

It is the insights and the style of thinking implicit in this theory, even as
subsequently critiqued,39 that we use to inform our initial analysis of the
potential coming trend in transnational securities offerings. That trend
will see issuances and listings in non-U.S. jurisdictions move in precisely
the opposite direction— public capital raising transactions by issuers going
from perceived stronger investor protection jurisdictions to weaker perceived investor protections— in India and the PRC.
U.K.-headquartered accountancy firms in connection with their flawed audits (and
refusal to give up work papers) regarding a number of indirect offerings tied to PRC
assets. For the last event, see the SEC administrative law judge decision, available at
http://sec.gov/alj/aljdec/2014/id553ce.pdf.
36. See The Dodd-Frank Act and Foreign Private Issuers: U.S. Financial Reform Creates
New Risks and Obligations for Foreign Businesses Listed in the United States or Otherwise
Subject to SEC Reporting Requirements, MINTZ LEVIN SECURITIES ADVISORY (Jan. 18, 2011),
available at http://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2011/Advisories/0856-0111-NAT-SEC/
web.htm.
37. Coffee was also writing before the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (SOX), and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (Dodd-Frank), and the rise
of what some critics have called “quack corporate governance,” or corporate governancerelated mandates imposed via securities regulation. See, for example: Larry E. Ribstein,
Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005); Robert Charles Clark,
Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for
Policymakers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251 (2005); Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley
After Three Years, 3 N.Z. L. REV. 365 (2005); and Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank:
Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1781 (2010 – 2011).
The critique is not unanimous or entirely despairing, however; see, e.g., Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise is the
Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1845 (2006-7) (contesting the Romano critique of SOX
point by point); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial
Reform Tends to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019,
1022-26 (2012) (dubbing the “quack corporate governance” complainants a “‘Tea Party
Caucus’ of corporate and securities law professors”); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L.REV. 588, 601-607 (2003); and Clark, supra, at 290 (asserting that
Delaware is quite up to the challenge presented by encroaching federal securities
regulation).
38. See Racing to the Top, supra note 22, at 1779– 83.
39. See, for example, Amir N. Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding
or Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L 141, 142 (Spring 2003) (“Based on a comprehensive review
of the literature, I argue that the [bonding role of cross-listing] has been greatly overstated. A large body of evidence, using various research methodologies, indicates that
the bonding theory is unfounded. Indeed, the evidence supports an alternative theory,
which may be called the “avoiding hypothesis.” To the extent that corporate governance
issues play a role in the cross-listing decision, it is a negative role. The dominant factors
in the choice of cross-listing destination markets are access to cheaper finance and
enhancing the issuer’s visibility. Corporate governance is a second-order consideration
whose effect is either to deter issuers from accessing better-regulated markets or to
induce securities regulators to allow foreign issuers to avoid some of the more exacting
domestic regulations.”).
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Issuers from Stronger Perceived Investor Protection Jurisdictions
IPO in India

Since 2000, Indian law has allowed foreign issuers to raise capital in
India via the Indian Depository Receipt (IDR) program.40 Moreover, a
number of regulatory changes that facilitated IDRs were made between
2000 and 2009 by the various regulators (i.e., the Ministry of Company
Affairs (MCA), Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and the
Reserve Bank of India (RBI)).41
A foreign issuer may use the IDR program if it meets the requirements
for a domestic issuer along with the following key requirements: (i) a track
record of distributable profits for a minimum of three of the previous five
years, (ii) a continuous trading history for the three immediately preceding
years on its home country exchange, (iii) net tangible assets of at least Rs. 3
crore (approximately USD 500,000 at current exchange rates; a crore is 10
million rupees) in each of the three preceding years (they must be full
years), (iv) net worth of at least Rs. 1 crore in each of the three preceding
years (they must be full years), (v) no prohibition against the issuance of
securities by any regulatory body, and (vi) a track record of compliance
with securities regulation requirements in its home country.42
When engaging in an IDR offering, a minimum of 50% of the issue is
to be allotted to qualified institutional buyers (QIBs), 30% to retail individual investors, and the remainder to non-institutional investors and employees.43 IDRs can be converted into equity shares in the foreign issuer after
one year from the issuing of the IDR, but this is subject to other Indian
laws— e.g., foreign exchange laws— that may hamper the IDR’s fungibility.44
Conversion from equity shares into IDRs is also available.45
As noted at the start of this article, only one firm has thus far under40. See Section 605A, Companies Act 1956, Act No. 1 of 1956; Section 390, Companies Act 2013, available at http://indiacode.nic.in/acts-in-pdf/182013.pdf. We thank
Yash Ashar, Partner, Amarchand Mangaldas & Suresh Shroff, Mumbai for helpful conversations on the process through which the Standard Chartered IDR occurred. Mr.
Ashar was one of the lead attorneys on the behalf of Standard Chartered for the IDR.
41. See Companies (Issue of Indian Depository Receipts) Rules 2004; SEBI (Issue of
Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2009, Chapter VIA; SEBI Circular
No. CFD/DIL/IDR/1/2006/3/4 (Model Listing Agreement for IDRs) [and update in
2009 and 2013]; Sections 10(4) and 11(1) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act,
1999; Issue of Indian Depository Receipts (http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Notification/
PDFs/APDIR5220709.pdf), Reserve Bank of India, July 22, 2009 [hereinafter RBI Issue of
IDR Rules].
42. See Clause 26, Chapter III (Provisions as to public issue), SEBI (Issue of Capital
and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, Aug. 2009 (http://www.sebi.gov.in/Index.
jsp?contentDisp=SubSection&sec_id=5_sec_id=5) Securities and Exchange Board of
India (SEBI), Aug. 26, 2009.
43. See Reg. 2(1) of SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2009.
44. See SEBI Unveils IDR Conversion Norms, THE HINDU, Mar. 2, 2013, http://www
.thehindu.com/business/markets/sebi-unveils-idr-conversion-norms/
article4466062.ece.
45. See id.
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taken an IDR issuance— Standard Chartered Bank in 2010.46 Its quite
explicit motivation was not legal bonding, but instead something that more
closely conforms to the thrust of this article: a signaling of its commitment
to the Indian subcontinent and an effort to boost its foreign market visibility.47 However, it should be noted that the Standard Chartered IDR was
largely subscribed by Foreign Institutional Investors (who made up at least
85% of investors). Therefore, and perhaps contrary to appearances, the IDR
did not succeed in creating a large base of Indian investors who owned
Standard Chartered.48
Since then, there have been reports of other foreign firms considering
an IDR (e.g., Vodafone, HSBC, Citibank), but they have not proceeded further at this stage. The lack of interest in further IDRs seems related to questions about fungibility,49 tax uncertainty, and the requirements for
allocating 50% of the IDR issuance to certain types of investors.50 At present, IDRs are not automatically convertible into the underlying shares;
SEBI now permits shareholders to convert IDRs into equity shares (and
vice versa),51 but conversion is only allowed upon RBI approval. In contrast, persons resident in India are allowed to hold the shares in order to
sell within 30 days of the conversion.52
Recently, the Government of India has begun consideration of an
expert committee report that suggests revamping the IDR program— including a new name of “Bharat Depository Receipts”— and opening up the possibility of more foreign firms cross-listing in India, amongst other
changes.53 The Government of India appears interested in promoting
46. See id.; see Shikhar Balwani, A Slow Start for Standard Chartered IDR, WALL
STREET J., June 11, 2010, http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2010/06/11/a-slow-startfor-standard-chartered-idr/.
47. See IDR Listing to Enhance StanChart’s Commitment to India: CEO, BUSINESS
STANDARD, Mumbai Nov. 12, 2009, available at (http://www.business-standard.com/
india/news/idr-listing-to-enhance-stancharts-commitment-to-india-ceo/13/37/78171/
on).
48. See STANDARD CHARTERED PLC, DISTRIBUTION OF IDR HOLDINGS AS ON QUARTER
ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2013, (2013).
49. See India Said to Limit Depository Receipt Swap at $5 bn, BUSINESS STANDARD, July
5, 2012, available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/markets/india-said-tolimit-depository-receipt-swap-at-5-bn-112070500083_1.html.
50. See SEBI, supra note 41, Ch. 5 Clause 98 Conditions for Issue of IDR.
51. See id. Ch. 5 Clause 100 Fungibility.
52. See Procedure for Transfer and Redemption of IDRs, Reserve Bank of India, July
22, 2009.
53. See Finance Ministry Panel Proposes New Class of Securities ‘Bharat Depository
Receipts’, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, June 26, 2014, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes
.com/2014-06-26/news/50884742_1_idrs-indian-depository-receipts-foreign-securities
[hereinafter BhDRs]; Sahoo Panel Moots Bharat Depository Receipts Framework to Reboot
IDRs, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, June 27, 2014, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes
.com/2014-06-27/news/50912268_1_indian-investors-framework-company-secretaries
[hereinafter Reboot BhDRs]. The reports referred to in the newspaper articles are: MINISTRY OF FINANCE, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE FCCBS
AND ORDINARY SHARES (THROUGH DEPOSITORY RECEIPT MECHANISM) SCHEME, 1993 (Nov.
2013) [hereinafter SAHOO_I], available at http://www.finmin.nic.in/reports/
Sahoo_Committee_Report.pdf and then MINISTRY OF FINANCE, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE FRAMEWORK OF ACCESS TO DOMESTIC AND
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India as an international financial center and increasing options for Indian
investors.54 With these changes, it is quite likely that the stalled interest in
IDRs/Bharat Depository Receipts would move into higher gear.
III.

Issuers from Stronger Perceived Investor Protection Jurisdictions
Raising Capital in the People’s Republic of China

As of this writing, the PRC has seen nothing like the 2010 Standard
Chartered Bank IDR IPO and listing on the NSE described immediately
above. However, there has been a very rich discussion— for more than a
decade— about the real possibility of establishing (i) a China Depositary
Receipts (CDR) program pursuant to which non-PRC issuers would issue
non-Renminbi yuan (RMB) -denominated China Depositary Shares to back
CDRs listed on a Chinese exchange; these CDRs would be held and traded
in RMB by PRC citizens, resident investors, or PRC-domiciled institutions
(and of course Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) permitted
entry into the A share55 markets); and (ii) an “international board”
whereby non-PRC issuers might accomplish an IPO and listing on the
Shanghai Stock Exchange of A shares.56
OVERSEAS CAPITAL MARKETS (PHASE II, PART I: INDIAN DEPOSITORY RECEIPTS) (June 2014)
[hereinafter Sahoo_II], available at http://www.finmin.nic.in/reports/idr_report_2014
0609.pdf; THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA Nov. 1949, Part 1, art. 1, available at http://law
min.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/coi-indexenglish.ht.
54. See BhDRs, supra note 53; Reboot BhDRs, supra note 53; Sahoo_I, supra note 53;
Sahoo_II, supra note 53.
55. Without delving too deeply into the alphabet soup comprising PRC equity securities designations, “A shares” are RMB-denominated equity securities, issued by PRCdomiciled firms to PRC resident natural persons and PRC-domiciled legal persons (and
foreign-domiciled QFIIs who participate in the RMB markets up to a given quota of
exchange capital investment), and traded in RMB. They can be contrasted with what are
known as “B shares,” RMB-denominated equity securities issued by PRC-domiciled
firms to foreign persons, foreign-domiciled legal persons, and, since February 2001,
PRC natural and legal persons with authorized access to foreign exchange. Because of
size and volume constraints imposed by foreign exchange capital account restrictions
and a radical lack of liquidity, the B share markets have long been considered moribund,
especially when compared to the A share markets. Finally, “H shares” (a market idiom
used to describe all of the original “H” (or Hong Kong-listed) and “N” (New York-listed),
“L” (London-listed), “S” (Singapore-listed), etc. shares) are equity shares listed by PRCdomiciled issuers on foreign (including Hong Kong) exchanges and traded in foreign
currencies. The initiatives discussed in this article center on the opening up of the A
share markets for foreign-domiciled issuers, matching in a sense what the QFII initiative
did for the A share markets on the foreign-domiciled investor side, and to be distinguished
on the PRC-domiciled issuer side from the dual A share/H share listings by major
corporatized PRC state-owned enterprises.
56. For Shanghai listings by foreign-domiciled issuers, see Enoch Yiu, Shanghai
Bourse Studies Listing of Multinationals, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 19, 2007),
http://www.scmp.com/article/616267/shanghai-bourse-studies-listing-multinationals;
Stephanie Tong, Whole Bank, Not Just HSBC China, for Shanghai Listing, THE STANDARD
(Dec. 15, 2007); Sundeep Tucker & Justine Lau, Beijing Set to Encourage Foreign Listings,
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2008), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7954771a-c51b-11dc-811a0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3F7AZFL5a; NYSE Set to List on Shanghai Exchange, SOUTH
CHINA MORNING POST (April 15, 2008); see Li-Gang Liu, How an International Board will
Free up China’s Stock Market, CHINA DAILY (last updated Jan. 4, 2013), http://www
.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2013-01/07/content_16091877.htm; David Barboza,
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While this was frequently in the news almost a decade ago, official
and popular Chinese interest in a CDR program has recently faded.57 That
is because the long-standing PRC domestic investor appetite for the equities of non-PRC domiciled or listed but PRC-controlled issuers58 was
largely sated by two developments: (i) the increased repatriation of the
PRC’s corporatized state-owned enterprise issuers and their dual “H” and
“A” share listings;59 and (ii) the establishment of a PRC Qualified Domestic
Institutional Investor (QDII) program in April 2006.60 That appetite will
only be further met with the imminent mutual recognition of investment
funds between the PRC and Hong Kong, which will allow mutual funds
domiciled in Hong Kong to sell interests directly to PRC investors (and, less
importantly in the context of this writing, vice versa).61 In short, fast moving regulatory developments providing a robust channel for PRC-domiciled
Shanghai Exchange Finalizing Plans for Foreign Listings, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2010), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/business/global/16exchange.html?_r=0; Shanghai
Mayor Says Timing Not Right for Exchange’s International Board, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan.
16, 2012), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-16/shanghai-mayorsays-timing-not-right-for-international-board.html. For CDRs, see Zhang Jiwei, CDR
Zoufeng [CDR Whirlwind], 39 CAIJING MAGAZINE 58– 60 (June 2001); Michael Wei &
Jason Subler, Reuters Summit – BNY Mellon Sees First China Depositary Receipt Listings
Next Year, REUTERS FIN. REGULATORY FORUM (Sept. 2, 2009), http://blogs.reuters.com/
financial-regulatory-forum/2009/09/02/reuters-summit-bny-mellon-sees-first-chinadepository-receipt-listings-next-year/.
57. See Shanghai Mayor Says Timing Not Right, supra note 56.
58. So-called “Red Chips” and/or indirect PRC issuers, organized and established
under Hong Kong or foreign law, and/or only listed in Hong Kong or overseas which are
really or primarily China businesses. See generally HONG KONG IPO GUIDE 2013 63
(LexisNexis 2013).
59. Contrast the transaction histories of China Mobile Limited, a Hong Kong-domiciled and Hong Kong Stock Exchange-listed (with ADRs on the NYSE) issuer, which
issues shares that cannot be purchased on the PRC’s domestic capital markets, and the
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, a PRC-domiciled issuer which effected simultaneous IPOs of H shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and A shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.
60. See Y. Nancy Ni, China’s Capital Flow Regulations: The Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor and the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor Programs, 28 REV. BANKING
AND FIN. L. 299, 316 (2009). In mid-2013, after reviewing the State Administration of
Foreign Exchange (SAFE) website, one law firm reported that as of the end of June 2013,
there were 112 PRC QDIIs holding over US$85 billion in overseas investments, with
those QDIIs including 29 commercial banks, 47 securities companies and fund managers, 28 insurance companies and 8 trust companies. See Richard Mazzochi, Minny Siu
& Hayden Finn, KWM Connect: QDII – An Offshore Perspective, KING AND WOOD MALLESONS, available at: www.kwm.com/hong-kong/documents/KWM_Connect_Jul_13_v4_
LR.pdf.
61. Following on the heels of another pilot program started in September 2013, a
Qualified Domestic Limited Partner (QDLP) program, whereby six foreign hedge funds
were allowed to raise up to US$50 million in RMB yuan from PRC institutions slated for
foreign investments. See David S. Wang, Yi Lu, Jenny Sheng & Coral Yu, Hong Kong
Based Funds May be Open to Investments from PRC Investors, Paul Hastings LLP (January
8, 2014), available at www.paulhastings.com/Resources/Upload/Publications/ChinaMatters-Alert-on-Mutual-Recognition-Program.pdf. For the near-certain future path in
this area, see Alexa Lam, Deputy Chief Executive Officer of the Hong Kong Stock and
Futures Commission, Keynote Speech at the 7th Hong Kong Investment Funds Association Annual Conference (December 4, 2013), available at www.sfc.hk/web/files/ER/
PDF/Speeches/Alexa_20131204.pdf.
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retail and institutional investment in foreign equities and funds have overtaken, and will continue to overtake, the original need for a CDR program.
The original CDR goals now appear too narrowly focused on individual
foreign-issued equities for China’s investment population.
Ambitions for a Shanghai “international board” are, conversely, still
very much front and center in China’s specialist and popular discourse.
This attention is perhaps only increased by the PRC central government’s
acknowledged desire to make Shanghai into an “international financial
center” by 2020 (as with India’s recent reform proposals in a similar direction).62 Indeed, the late 2013 announcement about the establishment of a
new “China (Shanghai) Free Trade Zone” led to a frenzy in China and
abroad about that Zone being approved as the venue for the Shanghai
“international board.”63 The CSRC was forced to issue a categorical denial
of any preparations or approvals regarding the establishment of the “international board” in or through the Zone through a Chinese social networking website, Weibo.
While it is true that there are abundant issues connected with the
establishment of a viable “international board” at or under the Shanghai
Stock Exchange,64 perhaps the biggest difficulty stems from the continued
constraints on convertibility of the RMB on the capital account. These
restraints have operated since the very start of China’s reform and opening
to the outside world policy, and it appears that China is moving inexorably
towards the final elimination of those constraints.65 If and when those
blocks are removed, there will be no significant obstacle to the implementation of an international board on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, nor on
IPOs by specific non-PRC domiciled issuers directed towards the citizenry
of China.

62. State Council: Making Shanghai a New Global Financial Center, PEOPLE’S DAILY
ONLINE, March 26, 2009, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90857/
90862/6623230.html.
63. See, e.g., Shangjiaosuo Jiang Zai Zimaoqu Jiedao Tuichu Guojiban – Gushi Yingxiang Jiexi [Shanghai Stock Exchange Will Borrow the Free Trade Zone to Roll Out an
International Board – Analyzing Effect on the Equity Markets], HEXUN NET, Oct. 10,
2013, http://stock.hexun.com/2013-10-10/158598505.html.
64. See generally Qi Bin, Chen Yimin & Jiang Xinghui, Jingwai Qiye Jingnei Shangshi
De Zhanlue Sikao [Study on the Domestic Listings of Foreign Enterprises Strategy], CSRC
(May 2008), available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/yjzx/zbscycx/yjbg/
200908/p020090806674870622611 (detailing the reasons for the initiative, the conditions already in place for it, issues that remain to be solved, and specific proposals
designed to bring the idea to fruition).
65. See Mark Kruger, Reform and Risk in the Chinese Financial System, 2 China Inst.
Occasional Paper Series 8 (May 2013), available at http://www.china.ualberta.ca/
Research%20and%20Publications/~/media/China%20Institute/Documents/Publica
tion/Occasional%20Paper/ChinaInstituteOccassionalPaper2-MarkKruger.pdf (alluding
to a February 2012 People’s Bank of China (PBOC) published report authored by the
Director General of the PBOC Statistics Department entitled “The Time Is Right to Open
the Capital Account.”).
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Additional Transnational Capital-raising Hypotheses
Introduction

Given the contemporary developments sketched out above, and with
the central tenets of the legal bonding hypothesis in mind, it is useful to
consider some of the many reasons why foreign— and in particular widelyheld— issuers from stronger perceived investor protection markets like the
United States or the U.K. would seek an IPO and listing on a Chinese,
Indian, or similar nation’s exchange. This inquiry is useful for a more
nuanced understanding of the legal bonding hypothesis in two ways. First,
it may alter our perceptions about whether the primary reason for crosslisting is that securities issuers are opting into higher regulatory or disclosure standards (than their home countries) to implement a form of legal
bonding.66 Second, it may also dilute the force of a long-standing negative
intuition of the bonding hypothesis— when issuers engage in reverse crosslisting, their shares exhibit negative abnormal returns as the result of market expectations that the foreign listing will facilitate conduct that would
be impermissible in the home market.67 Through this analysis, we may
come to a better understanding of the ways in which issuer choice in the
global capital markets operates.
What, then, are some of the theories or justifications for why issuers
engage in reverse cross-listing? Here, we offer some initial ideas before discussing what we will call consumer-commercial markets bonding.
B.

“Bonding” into Perceived Weaker Investor Protection Jurisdictions?

First we ask the perhaps counter-intuitive question urged upon us by
the “legal bonding” hypothesis: do India and China have superior corporate
governance and market regulation, or at least the appearance of such regulation, which delivers on the “legal bonding” promise for the foreign issuers
who access their markets? While both of us, and others, have explored the
complexities of India’s and China’s evolving corporate governance and
market regulation regimes68 and often found encouraging developments,
66. See Future as History, supra note 1, at 651– 52.
67. See id. at 674– 75.
68. On India: see Vikramaditya Khanna, Corporate Governance in India: Past, Present
& Future?, 1 JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 171 (2009); Umakanth Varottil, A Cautionary Tale of
the Transplant Effect on Indian Corporate Governance, 21 NAT’L LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA REV.
1 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1331581; N. Balasubramaniam, Bernard
S. Black & Vikramaditya Khanna, The Relation Between Firm-Level Corporate Governance
and Market Value: A Case Study of India, 11 EMERGING MARKETS REV. 319– 40 (2010),
available at www.elsevier.com/locate/emr; Khanna & Varottil, supra note 33; Dhammika
Dharmapala & Vikramaditya Khanna, Corporate Governance, Enforcement, and Firm
Value: Evidence from India, 29 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 1056– 84 (2013); Rajesh Chakrabarti,
Corporate Governance in India - Evolution and Challenges (January 17, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=649857; Franklin Allen, Rajesh Chakrabarti, Sankar De, Jun
Qian & Meijun Qian, Financing Firms in India (World Bank Policy Research Paper No.
3975, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=923282; Afra Afsharipour, A Brief
Overview of Corporate Governance Reforms in India (UC Davis Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 258, 2011) [hereinafter Afsharipour, Overview], available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1729422; Afra Afsharipour, The Promise and Challenges of India’s Corporate
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common perceptions of their investor protections has not yet shifted to
“strong.” Indeed, the perception seems to be that their legal systems and
institutions are quite opaque, corrupt, inconsistent, poorly administered,
inefficient, and riddled with sub-standard public and private enforcement.69 If the legal bonding hypothesis seems unlikely as an explanation,
then why else would a foreign issuer (e.g., from the United States or U.K.)
seek an IPO and listing in India or China?
C.

The Simple Quest for Capital; and the Quest for Unconvertible
Currency

One potential explanation may be that India and China are both countries with many actual and potential investors who have limited domestic
investment options, and both countries have a high demand for offerings.
Accordingly, a listing for a foreign issuer might offer the prospect of
increased investor liquidity and price benefits in the future, even if these
benefits are not presently available because of capital controls and resulting market segmentation.70 In addition, an IPO in these jurisdictions is an
Governance Reforms, 1 INDIAN J. OF L. & ECON. 33 (2010) [hereinafter Afsharipour,
Promise and Challenges], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1640249; Bernard S.
Black & Vikramaditya Khanna, Can Corporate Governance Reforms Increase Firm Value?
Event Study Evidence from India, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 749, 759 (2007). On the
PRC: see Nicholas C. Howson, The Doctrine That Dared Not Speak Its Name – AngloAmerican Fiduciary Duties in China’s 2005 Company Law and Case Law Intimations of
Prior Convergence, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 193 (HIDEKI
KANDA, KON-SIK KIM & CURTIS MILHAUPT EDS., 2008); Nicholas C. Howson, China’s
Restructured Commercial Banks: Nomenklatura Accountability Serving Corporate Governance Reform?, in CHINA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS: CHALLENGES AND GLOBAL IMPACT
123 (Martha Avery, Cai Jinqing & Zhu Min eds., 2009); Nicholas C. Howson, Corporate
Law in the Shanghai People’s Courts, 1992-2008: Judicial Autonomy in a Contemporary
Authoritarian State, 5 E.ASIA L.REV. 303 (2010) [hereinafter Howson, Corporate Law];
Nicholas Calcina Howson, Enforcement Without Foundation? – Insider Trading and
China’s Administrative Law Crisis, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 955 (2012); Clarke & Howson,
supra note 33; Nicholas Calcina Howson, Punishing Possession – China’s All-Embracing
Insider Trading Enforcement Regime, in INSIDER TRADING RESEARCH HANDBOOK 327 (STEPHEN P. BAINBRIDGE, ED., 2013); Nicholas Calcina Howson, ‘Quack Corporate Governance’
as Traditional Chinese Medicine – The Securities Regulation Cannibalization of China’s Corporate Law and a State Regulator’s Battle Against Party State Political Economic Power, 37
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 667 (2014). On both India and the PRC, see Nicholas Calcina Howson & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, The Development of Modern Corporate Governance in
China and India, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 513, 527– 31
(MUTHUCUMARASWAMY, SORNARAJAH & WANG JIANGYU EDS., 2010).
69. See Afsharipour, Promise and Challenges, supra note 68, at 34, 54, 59; see Howson, Corporate Law, supra note 68, at 321– 25, 417– 19.
70. See Just in Case: Capital Controls Are Back as Part of Many Countries’ Financial
Armoury, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 2013, available at http://www.economist.com/news/
special-report/21587383-capital-controls-are-back-part-many-countries-financialarmoury-just-case (discussing the lack of liquidity due to capital control’s and China’s
motivation for such controls); See also Y. Nancy Ni, supra note 60, at 299. At the same
time, initial market segmentation resulting from capital controls, positioned alongside
relative scarcity, may also produce a positive price differential for issuers, as between the
perceived weaker investor protections capital markets-traded stock and the rest-of-world
traded stock. The great natural experiment/expression of this phenomenon is the very
significant price differential between A share and H shares (including shares listed in
London and New York) listed by PRC-domiciled issuers on the Shanghai Stock Exchange
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excellent way to raise local currency, especially when capital account controls are in effect. These funds can then be used for local investments and/
or business operations, rather than converting hard currency into local
currency with the attendant exchange rate, remittance, and taxation
risks.71 This rationale might hold true for a wide range of foreign businesses, from products manufacturers seeking to capitalize or operate productive facilities, to financial institutions keen to transact and lend in the
local currency. This dynamic is visible in the push for a Shanghai Stock
Exchange international board, and was additionally evidenced in 2010 by
the use of so-called “Dim Sum Bonds” by non-PRC foreign multinational
McDonalds Corporation. McDonalds used these instruments to directly
raise RMB yuan, the PRC’s only partially-convertible currency, for its incountry operations.72
D.

The Race to the Less-costly Middle; Rule 10b-5 and the Morrison
Effect; Pre-bonded Issuers

Public securities issuances, especially in the U.S. markets, are very
expensive in absolute terms— they require the involvement of underwriters,
lawyers, and accountants. Expenses continue indefinitely with the burdens
of continuing disclosure, which require the continued involvement of lawyers and accountants.73 Foreign markets, especially those with perceived
weaker investor protections, must appear ex ante to be comparatively
cheaper both on the primary transaction side and with respect to continuing disclosure.
One specific “cost” that issuers from stronger perceived investor protection nations, particularly non-U.S. firms, may be interested in avoiding
are the costs associated with Rule 10b-5 class action litigation by private
attorneys.74 Here, issuers from stronger perceived investor jurisdictions
and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (or London, New York, etc.) respectively. The Hong
Kong equivalent of the Dow Jones or S&P indices, The Hang Seng Index, even goes so far
as to track this differential via a separate index, the “Hang Seng China AH Premium
Index.” This differential will remain as long as PRC capital account controls remain in
place, and there is no significant opportunity for arbitrage between A and H share holdings. See Shanghai-Hong Kong Valuation Gap Narrows on Stock Arbitrage Bets, BLOOMBERG,
July 28, 2014, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-28/china-s-stockindex-futures-rise-after-industrial-profits-climb.html (indicating that the differential
between A and H shares has narrowed recently due to increased arbitrage opportunities
arising from the relaxing of capital controls on the capital markets).
71. See McDonalds Considers Dim Sum Bonds as Fundraising Option, BLOOMBERG, Feb.
27, 2012, [hereinafter McDonalds], available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201202-28/mcdonald-s-considers-dim-sum-bonds-as-fundraising-option.html (noting that
financing expansion in this manner is being considered by McDonalds); Xinhua Insight:
Global Investors Hunger for Dim Sum Bonds, XINHUA NET, July 7, 2014, available at http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2014-07/07/c_133466707.htm.
72. See McDonalds, supra note 71 (reporting that McDonalds will consider a second
issuance of RMB bonds in Hong Kong after its RMB 200 million yuan 3% three year
notes issued in 2010).
73. Considering an IPO? The Costs of Going and Being Public May Surprise You, PwC’s
Deals Practice, Sept. 12, 2012.
74. For a general discussion see Racing Towards the Top, supra note 22; Merritt B.
Fox, Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Issuers, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1173 (2012); Beit-
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may share the perceptions of fellow issuers from weaker perceived investor
protection jurisdictions that have run into the teeth of the orthodox legal
bonding promise.75 For issuers from relatively stronger perceived investor
protection market issuers, avoidance of 10b-5 class actions can be achieved
not only by refusing to enter the U.S. capital markets, but also by affirmatively entering another national market which 10b-5 cannot reach. This is
where the change signaled by Justice Scalia’s opinion in the 2010 U.S.
Supreme Court case Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd. becomes highly relevant. In Morrison, the Court laid aside the long-standing “conduct” and
“effects” tests used by the lower federal courts for application of U.S. federal securities anti-fraud laws, stating that civil liability under such laws
would attach only to transactions in securities listed on a U.S. stock
exchange and to securities transactions taking place in the U.S.76 Accordingly, the opinion provided a solid rationale for any non-U.S. issuer’s election to list on non-U.S. exchanges (and prohibit any ADR program on their
non-U.S.-listed shares).
Even U.S.-domiciled or headquartered firms might take advantage of
Morrison by having their non-U.S.-domiciled subsidiaries achieve listings
on non-U.S. exchanges (especially if they keep the proceeds outside of the
U.S.), which might include weaker perceived investor protection markets,
thereby neatly avoiding the threat of 10b-5 class action lawsuits (and perhaps even SEC enforcement under the “conduct” or “effects” tests). Of
course, any such U.S. issuer would have to calculate the degree to which
such a strategy might be noted inside the United States and the resulting
costs of being perceived as “off-shoring.”77
ing Cheng, Suraj Srinivasan, and Gwen Yu, Securities Litigation Risk for Foreign Companies Listed in the U.S. (June 2014), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2163864
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2163864; Rene Stulz, Globalization, Corporate
Finance, and the Cost of Capital, 12 J. OF APPLIED CORPORATE FIN. 8 (1999); W. Reese and
Michael Weisbach, Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-Listings in the
United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings, 66 J. OF FIN. ECON. 65 (2002).
75. For example, see Plaintiffs Lawyers Continue to Target U.S. Listed Chinese Companies, D&O Diary, Sept. 25, 2013, available at http://www.dandodiary.com/2013/09/
articles/securities-litigation/more-about-stories-were-following-libor-scandal-firrea-chi
nese-company-securities-suits; Kevin LaCroix, U.S. Listed Chinese Companies Attracting
Scrutiny, Securities Suits, D&O Diary, Nov. 16, 2010, available at http://www.dandodiary.com/2010/11/articles/subprime-litigation/u-s-listed-chinese-companies-attractingscrutiny-securities-suits.
76. “Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American
stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.” See
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 2888. Dodd-Frank, at Section 929P(b) amending 1934 Act Section 27, restored federal court jurisdiction for just SEC enforcement actions under 10b-5
based on the previously in effect conduct and effects tests.
77. Conversely, some strong investor protection jurisdiction issuers might not find
home jurisdiction listing too costly, but may simply be unable to access the public capital markets in their home jurisdiction— for instance, where underwriters will not underwrite, and mutual funds are not interested in, small cap, development stage firms. For
these issuers, after the private or venture capital markets have been exhausted, a foreign
listing, even in a weaker perceived investor protections market, may be the only way
forward. See Graham Bowley, Fleeing to Foreign Shores – Fast-Growing Companies Look
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There may also be issuers from stronger perceived investor protection
markets who can both benefit from traditional “legal bonding” and also
access capital in weaker perceived investor protection markets. These issuers include firms with established listings in stronger perceived protections
markets, which then do a follow-on IPO and listing in a less well-perceived
market. Standard Chartered Bank is an excellent example of this phenomenon, as it is listed on the London Stock Exchange and the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange, and now has an IDR listing on India’s NSE. According to the
legal bonding hypothesis, Standard Chartered is already “bonded” to the
apparently better norms associated with its primary listing jurisdiction. A
listing in an apparently weaker jurisdiction does not disturb that valuation
support.
There are other potential costs for such issuers arising from this kind
of secondary listing, however. For example, what if India’s NSE listing
requirements, securities law, or corporate law mandated that any issuer
listing stock on the NSE have a board of directors that is entirely independent? Or what if an issuer from a perceived stronger investor protections
market completes an IPO on a future international board of the Shanghai
Stock Exchange, where CSRC regulations and now PRC law require that
one-third of the board directors be independent directors as understood
under Chinese law? In short, an issuer from a perceived stronger investor
protections jurisdiction with a dual-listing in both a well-regarded market
and a weaker perceived venue might thereby subject itself to even more
onerous corporate governance norms, with limited benefit from legal
bonding.
Whatever the true effect such dual listings have on the value of these
firms, we suspect that in the short term it is precisely these kinds of
stronger investor protection jurisdiction issuers that are likely to engage in
IPOs in weaker perceived investor protection markets. Those firms will
seek such listings for the “consumer-commercial markets bonding” that we
discuss immediately below. Thus, we may expect to see established multinational firms with longtime listings in environments perceived to have
stronger investor protection accessing capital through entry points like
India’s IDR program or Shanghai’s future international board.78
E.

“Consumer-commercial Markets Bonding”

There is, however, another factor that we think is thrown into prominence by our consideration of the coming reverse listing traffic, which is
infrequently discussed even under the traditional legal bonding hypothesis.
Abroad for Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 8, 2011, at B1 (focusing on start-up companies’
migration to foreign exchanges even for IPOs).
78. Only when we see a non-U.S. or non-U.K.-listed issuer IPO directly and exclusively in India or China— for instance, if Prada had listed immediately and only on the
Shanghai Stock Exchange (instead of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange), or a U.S. or European pharmaceutical company completes an IDR IPO on the NSE without a prior IPO in
the U.S. or U.K.— will the world have a suitable “control” for the theoretically negative
value effects of entanglement with a weaker perceived investor protections jurisdiction,
or indeed no effect whatsoever.
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This factor is the desire of issuers to effect a kind of broad advertisingcommitment bonding into the receiving markets, distinct from the reputational punch of perceived better governance/regulation at the heart of the
legal bonding hypothesis.
This broad consumer-commercial markets bonding consists of several
components: (i) a straight advertising-type appeal to the receiving jurisdiction’s products and services markets and the consumers who participate in
such markets; (ii) reputational enhancement as a global firm with a local
identity (and presumably local understanding); (iii) the signaling of longterm commitment by the issuing firm to that specific market, as well as the
prospect of products/services market consumer ownership; (iv) acknowledgment of the sovereign legal-regulatory establishment of the nation in
which the issuer is listing; and (v) an appeal to the receiving market’s regulators for the provision of franchise or licensing benefits.
To illustrate how these motivations and effects may operate, consider
the following example. Let us assume that J.P. Morgan Chase conducts an
IPO on a future Shanghai international board. It can be credibly assumed
that the transaction would: (i) aid that U.S. bank in advertising its financial
products and services in the Chinese domestic markets, while comparing
favorably against the less nimble PRC state-owned banks and relatively
unknown foreign banks; (ii) establish in the minds of Chinese investors
and government officials that Chinese retail investors and institutions have
ownership of one of the world’s most important financial institutions; (iii)
signal a deep long-term commitment to China above and beyond profiting
off of business operations in China and favorable wage rates; (iv) display
formal recognition of and submission to the Chinese legal and regulatory
system and its institutions; and (v) aid the U.S. bank in obtaining operational, investment, or organizational preferences under China’s post-World
Trade Organization (WTO)-accession regulation of foreign commercial
banking and/or investment banking operations inside the PRC.79 Indeed,
this example of strategic aims conceived for a hypothetical J.P. Morgan
Chase listing on the coming Shanghai international board may have
informed the actual Standard Chartered Bank IDR IPO on India’s NSE.80 It
is important to note the significance of the Standard Chartered Bank listing
in India due to the bank’s history in the sub-continent.81 Perhaps a future
Hong Kong Shanghai Bank Corporation or AIG IPO on the Shanghai international board may have greater significance than the entry of J.P. Morgan
79. See Liping He & Xiaohang Fan, Foreign Banks in Post-WTO China: An Intermediate Assessment, 12 CHINA & WORLD ECONOMY 3, 4-10 (2004) (describing developments
in foreign bank entry in China since China’s accession to the WTO).
80. See, e.g., Standard Chartered’s Indian Share Offering Opens, BBC BUSINESS NEWS,
May 25, 2010, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10151924.
81. See Our History, STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, www.sc.com/en/about-us/our-histo
ry.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2014) (explaining Standard Chartered Bank’s historical
foundation in India); see also India Sustainable Review 2012, Standard Chartered, 2012,
at 18 (providing an example of Standard Chartered Bank’s charitable involvement in
India and the Asia sub-continent).
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in the Chinese context.82
Although these benefits may matter a great deal for industries where
developing the trust of local customers is of great importance (e.g., in India
– IDR interest by Vodafone (cell phone services), HSBC and Citigroup
(banking and financial services)), they may also be beneficial in other
industries. Indeed, examples focusing on large multinational consumer
products firms like Proctor & Gamble, Unilever, Carrefour, McDonalds, or
large carmakers, where local consumers only interact more broadly with
the foreign issuer’s consumer products, would underline the benefits to be
won by an Indian or Chinese IPO for those firms.
We want to emphasize that these aims almost certainly also informed
non-U.S. issuers’ decisions to cross-list into the United States— the traditional focus of the legal bonding hypothesis— even though the theoretical
literature on traditional legal bonding rarely addresses this. Thus, aside
from the legal and reputational benefits offered and the access to the
“deepest, most liquid” pool of capital in the world, many developing world
non-U.S./U.K. issuers cross listed in the United States as part of an advertising strategy focused on the products and services that they hoped to
offer, or the developed market companies that they hoped to acquire and
control. One need only think of Tata Motors Limited and Lenovo in this
regard. The same can also be said for developed markets issuers listing in
the U.S. markets, like Daimler (i.e., before its purchase of Chrysler),
Deutsche Telecom, Vodaphone, etc.
F.

Measuring Success

The difficulty with evaluating this notion of consumer-commercial
markets bonding is that it potentially delivers very long-term benefits for
the issuer, which may not manifest so directly in the price effects on the
less investor-protective jurisdiction’s IPO stock. Prior research on the legal
bonding hypothesis has focused, quite appropriately, on the pricing value
apparently delivered by entanglement with more stringent corporate governance and market regulation in the listing firm’s home country (e.g., the
price effect, on the Brazilian Stock Exchange, of a Brazilian firm’s cross
listing in the United States). If, as we theorize here, the motivating benefits
for a reverse cross-listing are longer-term, highly dependent, and relate
largely to the enhancement of business operations and product development in the receiving jurisdiction, then it would seem that tracking the
price effects would present some empirical challenges; as an example, it
82. Just as Standard Chartered Bank has a strong history in India, Hong Kong
Shanghai Bank Corporation and American International Group have roots in Shanghai,
China. See HSBC’s History, HSBC, http://www.hsbc.com.hk/1/2/about/home/hsbc-shistory (last visited Oct. 20, 2014) (“The HSBC Group is named after its founding member, The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited, which was established
in 1865 in Hong Kong and Shanghai to finance the growing trade between China and
Europe.”); see also Our 90 Year History, AIG, http://www.aig.com/our-90-year-history_3171_437854.html (last updated Sept. 4, 2014) (“AIG traces its roots to 1919,
when American Cornelius Vander Starr established a general insurance agency, American Asiatic Underwriters, in Shanghai, China.”).
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would be problematic to try to estimate the price effect on the IPO price in
Shanghai of a NYSE-listed U.S. firm cross-listing in Shanghai based on
these longer-term benefits.83 Indeed, the price effect of greatest interest is
likely to be the impact on the price of the issuer’s stock in its home jurisdiction (i.e., the NYSE in the above example) after a cross-listing transaction. This may present its own challenges.84
G.

What Kinds of Foreign Issuers?

If the above is true, we can speculate about the kinds of issuers that
may seek to be listed on the perceived weaker investor protection markets.
This may also help us understand the relative importance of the substrains within what we have identified as a general theory of consumercommercial markets bonding85 as against the other motivations we highlight here, such as capital availability86 or the negative implication of the
traditional legal bonding hypothesis that foreign listings by U.S. companies
conjure negative price abnormalities.87
As a starting point, it seems that firms in businesses depending on
high levels of customer or supplier trust would benefit from consumercommercial markets bonding more than others. Sectors such as banking
and financial services, personal services, and technology-related services
(e.g., cell phones) seem particularly suited to explore reverse cross-listing.
Firms representing these sectors appear to have expressed interest in
reverse cross-listing, at least in India.88 In addition, and as we note above,
foreign firms that have a significant appetite for local currency, especially a
non-convertible or partially convertible currency, should also be very interested in cross-listing.89 However, sectors in which this level of trust is not
so necessary— for example, where there is no need for local currency
83. See generally Nicola Cetorelli & Stavros Peristiani, Firm Value and Cross-Listings:
The Impact of Stock Market Prestige, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF
REPORTS, No. 474 (Sept. 2010), http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/
sr474.pdf (finding a variable in the “future evolution of the destination market”).
84. See Jun Chen, Cinder Zhang & Yun Guan, Sweet Home? An Empirical Study on
Reverse Cross-Listing 3, 17 (23rd Australasian Finance and Banking Conference 2010
Paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1663391 (suggesting an analysis called “rented reputation,” where firms take advantage of investors’
relative lack of market knowledge by reverse cross-listing in a market with weaker corporate governance and still signaling to investors that a bonding effect will take place).
85. See id. at 2 (speculating on the kinds of issuers that may be attracted to reverselisting); see Mike W. Peng & Dane P. Blevins, Why Do Chinese Firms Cross-List in The
United States?, in THE CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES AND PROSPECTS
257 (Abdul A. Rasheed & Toru Yoshikawa eds., 2012) (discussing the reputational benefit of “global status”).
86. Chen et al., supra note 84, at 2.
87. Future as History, supra note 1, at 674– 75.
88. See India Said to Limit Depository Receipt Swap at $5 bn, BUSINESS STANDARD, July
5, 2012, available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/markets/india-said-tolimit-depository-receipt-swap-at-5-bn-112070500083_1.html.
89. See John F. Zhang, The Long-run Effect of Cross-listing on Firms: Evidence from
China (2014) (unpublished M.S. dissertation, Auckland University of Technology),
available at https://aut.researchgateway.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10292/7432/FanZ
.pdf?sequence=6.
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financing, or where there is a mystique to remaining overtly foreign— are
the ones where the value of this kind of bonding is less, making reverse
cross-listing less likely. For example, if high-end luxury producers of
goods such as Louis Vuitton bags or high-end Belgian Chocolates felt that
caché arose from their “otherness” or “foreignness,” they would probably
prefer to avoid any contrary association implicated by reverse cross-listing.
Issuers connected to such “snob effect” goods or services would be ones
that might find it counter-productive to do a reverse cross-listing.90 This
kind of industry/sector breakdown may be helpful in forming a base from
which to explore the potentially differential effects of reverse cross-listings.
Conclusion
In our increasingly global capital markets, the development of reverse
cross-listing seems, at first cut, to be slightly counter-intuitive. Prior scholarship indicates that one of the most common reasons for firms to crosslist in the United States or the U.K. is to obtain the benefits associated with
being listed in a jurisdiction perceived to be more protective of investors
than the firm’s home country— the legal bonding hypothesis. This added
level of perceived protection may make the firm a more appealing investment opportunity and cause investors to value the issuer more highly.
However, reverse cross-listing runs in the opposite direction— firms from
stronger perceived investor protection regimes, such as the United States or
the U.K., may still list in weaker perceived investor protection regimes, such
as India or China. This article provides an initial exploration into why
reverse cross-listing might arise with respect to specific product markets,
and what the practice may tell us about the decision to cross-list generally,
regardless of the listing direction.
Our analysis is necessarily preliminary because the level of real reverse
cross-listing has been minimal or clearly triggered by very specific circumstances (e.g., corporatized PRC state-owned enterprises domiciled offshore,
or “Red Chips,” seeking domestic listings) in both India and China. However, the fact that it happens at all, that important jurisdictions like India
and China seem keen for more of it to happen, that firms from the more
developed markets appear quite interested in engaging in more reverse
cross-listing into India and China, and that there is some disenchantment
with capital formation in the highly-regulated United States, all suggest
that reverse cross-listing is something that will grow. We explore a number
of potential explanations for reverse cross-listing that pertain to two radically different political economies (e.g., tapping Indian or Chinese investors’ interest, raising capital in currency-controlled countries for
expenditure therein, avoiding expensive U.S. securities enforcement), but
argue that the strongest explanation lies in our notion of consumer-commercial markets bonding. This involves the developed world listing firm’s
90. See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections
on Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV.
1381, 1388– 89 (2005) (describing the “snob effect” in fashion goods).
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substantial advertising into, or substantial commitment to, the receiving
country’s market and regulatory establishment.
This explanation for reverse cross-listing leads to predictions on which
types of firms may find reverse cross-listing an attractive option to pursue.
In particular, firms in sectors in which high levels of customer or supplier
trust are valuable, such as banking and financial services, or in which there
is an urgent need to raise local currency finance where that currency is
non- or partially-convertible, such as in manufacturing or in restaurant services, might find reverse cross-listing attractive. Conversely, sectors where
customers value the “foreignness” of an issuer’s product, such as in the
foreign-branded luxury goods industry, are less likely to follow this
approach. These predictions can then be tested as more instances of
reverse cross-listing arise.
This approach may also, conversely, provide deeper insights into why
some non-U.S. or non-U.K. firms may decide to list in the United States or
the U.K. on the transaction vector that originally triggered the legal bonding discussion. It may not always be entirely about legal bonding and
anticipated positive valuation effects, but also about obtaining other commercial advantages. Such a multi-factor analysis may aid in better understanding the effects of cross-listing generally on share prices. Sometimes
the increase in share price may reflect in part legal bonding, but may also
reflect some of these other benefits highlighted here. At times it may reflect
an offsetting of legal bonding and other effects. The newly-emphasized
dynamic highlighted by our initial consideration of reverse cross-listing
allows us to develop a more nuanced understanding of the cross-listing
phenomena generally as it develops in the future, and regardless of its
direction— orthodox or “reverse.”
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